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Philosophy must reconsider its relation to religion.1 Had it been 
voiced in the latter part of the 20th century such a claim would have 
appeared strange, slightly quixotic and troubling. Voiced today it has 
lost its air of strangeness or excess, it is merely troubling. While theo-
retically we recognise that political life in pluralistic multicultural 
societies needs to be conducted at a distance from determinate reli-
gious beliefs, practically these elements of life are becoming harder to 
keep separate. This manifests in a number of ways. Firstly, while poli-
ticians have instrumentalised religion for political ends, the religious 
have instrumentalised politics for religious ends. Secondly, efforts to 
keep religious reasons out of public discourse are read by the religious 
as discrimination, favouring those without determinate religious 
views. Thirdly, because of its history and origin, efforts to export secu-
lar liberal politics can appear as cultural imperialism—a ‘crusade’. 
In intellectual culture, thinkers like Alastair MacIntyre (1984; 1988), 
Stanley Hauerwas (2000) and John Milbank (1990; 1999) have all 
                                                             
1 This is a thought also expressed, although perhaps for different reasons, by 
Daniel C. Dennett (2007, xi-xii and 27). While I disagree with some of the claims 
made by Dennett in regard to religion (and the value of studying it through the 
humanities and social sciences) I agree that there is less profit to be had from a 
philosophy of religion primarily orientated on arguments for and against the 
existence of God than from a philosophy of religion orientated on understanding 
religion philosophically (whether this requires us to view it as a natural phenome-
non or not). 
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delivered religiously inspired criticisms of secular liberal democratic 
theory. Even Jürgen Habermas (2006) has voiced doubts, not just 
about the practicability of keeping religious reasons out of public 
discourse, but about the very justice of doing so. Such criticisms raise 
doubts about the Rawlsian and liberal priority of political values over 
moral and religious ones; a prioritisation that has led liberals to disen-
gage questions of substantive values in favour of the assertion of value 
pluralism. For Michael Sandel this leads to a political discourse lack-
ing moral resonance and which creates the space for “Fundamentalists 
[to] rush in where liberals fear to tread” (246). The liberal abandon-
ment of values talk gives the appearance that such talk is the exclusive 
preserve, or birthright, of a conservative few, an enclave that, as David 
to Goliath, heroically asserts the good against an amoral liberal politi-
cal culture. Indeed American philosopher Jeffery Stout (2004: 69–70), 
with John Rawls firmly in mind, has not only argued that the em-
ployment of religious reason in public debate is an important part of 
the American tradition of democracy but that the Rawlsian marginali-
sation of religious discourse constitutes a threat to that tradition by 
creating, in the religious, ambivalence towards, or resentment of, 
democracy itself (2004: 76–79). The Rawlsian prioritisation of the 
right over the good seems to make sense in the context of value plural-
ism, yet if in terms of motivation, in terms of the capacity to draw 
forth the commitment of engaged subjects, the good trumps the right, 
we risk opening a gulf of ambivalence and indifference in the heart of 
contemporary political practice. It is the capacity of religious dis-
course, and substantive values generally, to motivate a subject, which 
opens the possibility that this gulf of ambivalence and indifference, 
“the mother of chaos and night in the sciences” (Kant 1998: 100) 
could be filled by the narrow moralisms of some religious vanguard. 
In this regard Simon Critchley has recently remarked that while there 
is a motivational deficit in secular liberal democratic life, where our 
political values in fact seem de-motivating, that what does motivate 
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significant numbers are “frameworks of belief that call that secular 
project into question” (Critchley 2007a: 7). 
Recent years have seen traditionally secular societies, such as Austra-
lia, Britain and the US, increasingly move towards drawing churches 
into the provision of social services. Writing for the Australian Review 
of Public Affairs, an online journal, Australian scholar of religion 
Carole Cusack claims that “the governments of John Howard and 
George W Bush … [have attempted to] place certain government 
functions, such as job creation agencies, educational institutions, and 
welfare provision, back in the hands of the churches” and that such 
actions seek to address “the decline in social capital and civic engage-
ment … [brought about by] the loss of faith in Christianity” (Cusack 
2005). What is more, she makes the point that Howard engaged in 
“American-style religious rhetoric” and that in the face of Australia’s 
ethnic and religious diversity “for Howard Australian values are ex-
plicitly identified with Christian values” (Cusack 2005), an 
identification that fosters a suspicion of difference.  
This rhetoric, the identification of the Western Anglophone world 
with Christianity, which may be as much political strategy as the ex-
pression of Howard’s commitments, intersects with outbreaks of 
intolerance directed towards Muslim Australians and reinforces a 
sense that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan emerge from the tension 
between Christianity and Islam rather than a struggle for justice on 
one hand and the desire to control valuable resources on the other. 
Furthermore it is an identification that coheres with the neo-
conservative religious rhetoric that has been a feature of Bush’s presi-
dency, replete with its crusade against an ‘axis of evil’. Here, with 
America more in view, Cusack considers the belief by some conserva-
tive and fundamentalist Christians that the establishment of the state 
of Israel signals the second coming, and she remarks: “It may seem 
extraordinary that in the twenty first century, in countries where the 
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church and state are theoretically separate, that such beliefs could 
contribute in any way to foreign policy. Yet they do” (Cusack 2005). 
As such, and with Simon Critchley, one might feel inclined to the view 
that in the first years of the new century we have experienced “the 
chronic re-theologisation of politics” (Critchley 2007b: 82). This is a 
re-theologisation that one might descry, as Critchley does, in the 
“theological symmetry between George W. Bush and Osama bin 
Laden” (Critchley 2007a: 7). Alternatively it might be seen in the 
symmetry between the apocalyptic religious beliefs of Bush and 
Mahmood Ahmadinejad, the current president of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran; or even perhaps in the Messianic tones of the 2008 
Democratic Campaign. Tones that were not at all ameliorated in the 
invocation of God and Scripture, as presidents have generally done, in 
the inauguration speech of Barak Obama.  
Setting aside all of the partisan efforts to intellectually affirm religion 
or anti-religion and the metaphysical debate, the relation of religion, 
politics and social life is still a problem. True, political life in a plural-
istic society must be conducted with a degree of neutrality in terms of 
determinate belief, but such neutrality is difficult to achieve and there 
is a question whether it has ever been. If the religious feel a tension 
between secular liberal politics and religiously inspired ways of life, 
then this might lead to a criticism of the latter in the name of the for-
mer. Such criticisms are, however, external to the discourse of liberal 
secularity; they are criticisms that are mounted from a non-secular 
point of view. Yet in raising the question of the very neutrality of 
secular liberal politics a more pressing line of criticism is opened up, 
for the issue then becomes whether or not that mode of politics is 
adequate to its own principles. The discourse of secularism was not 
developed as a way of grappling with religious pluralism in general, 
but as a way for modern Christian societies to deal with sectarian 
disputes within Christianity. As such, secular discourse was framed 
largely within Christian conceptual categories, based on Christian 
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presuppositions about religion and the entailments of religiosity; little 
attention was given to other religions, even those that were part of the 
landscape of the early modern Europe in which secular discourse first 
formed (Judaism and Islam). While pointing to the origins of a dis-
course does little to show that it is illegitimate, it may be sufficient to 
motivate a critical enquiry into its scope. Such an enquiry would need, 
however, to be non-partisan and to allow its judgment to be formu-
lated against a background that does not itself presume the good of 
that which is being interrogated.  
It is clear then, that in a global context, consideration must be given to 
the way we have understood the relationship between politics and 
religion. Part of this consideration means turning to the way religion 
is understood in general. For if that term is primarily understood 
through a Christian experience—and who can doubt that a broadly 
Christian outlook has dominated philosophical engagement with 
religion—then the risk is that the categories through which we discuss 
it are culturally and theologically circumscribed and, as such, paro-
chial, barely reaching beyond the confines of one religious perspective. 
For instance, in the Lockean account, so influential to modern liberal 
secular theory, the role of government is sharply distinguished from 
religion, dividing human life into separate spheres of authority. This is 
the intellectual ancestor of the contemporary liberal and broadly 
Rawlsian notion that life can be neatly divided into a public political 
sphere and a private one where substantive commitments reign (De 
Roover & Balagangadhara 2008: 526–27). Yet this structure itself re-
capitulates the division asserted by Luther and re-affirmed by Calvin 
(De Roover & Balagangadhara 2008: 530–33), a structure that can be 
traced to Augustine; venerable ideas indeed but not entirely neutral 
and certainly not free of presupposition.  
While it is true that the origins of ideas are less important than their 
rationality, and true that rationality is a mark of legitimacy, the more 
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important question for secular liberal theory relates to what it is that 
renders the two spheres rational. For it may be the case that this struc-
ture has the appearance of rationality due to certain presuppositions 
that Western culture carries about the nature of religious commitment 
itself, say the idea that religious commitment is primarily concerned 
with otherworldly redemption for the individual believer, or with 
metaphysical beyonds, or drawing value from ultra-mundane sources. 
In general the notion that the concerns of religion are somehow frac-
tured from mundane existence and that religion is the concern of 
individual believers, is a matter of conscience. For someone with a 
Christian background the dual spheres may seem unproblematic and 
the height of rationality, but might appear so precisely because it is 
presumed that all modes of religiosity recapitulate the structure and 
shape of Christianity. But what about traditions, such as many forms 
of indigenous religiosity, not primarily orientated on otherworlds or 
otherworldly redemption for the individual believer, those more fo-
cused on this world than on some ‘otherworld’ or those orientated on 
the social rather than the individual. What about those religions that 
are primarily concerned with the way that life in this realm is gov-
erned and which provide specific prescriptions for how to govern it? 
Traditions where life is not subject to the kind of bifurcation between 
this world and the next that features in much Christian discourse? Do 
the two spheres make sense from that perspective? Further if the 
metaphysics of Christianity renders it easier for the Christian subject 
to affirm the secular liberal way of resolving the tension between relig-
ion and politics, a resolution that blossomed in Christian soil, then 
perhaps this places a burden on others that the Christian does not 
have to carry; leading to a concern about the justice of this resolution. 
These questions, concerns and issues throw interesting light on at-
tempts to export liberal democracy around the globe and the notion of 
a cosmopolitan secular world order, for both notions seem to rely on 
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the idea that there can be a relatively neat or easy compartmentalisa-
tion of substantive commitments from public life. 
Such complex issues cannot be resolved in an introduction; I merely 
raise the question of secularism to indicate that what we take to be a 
concluded issue might look different from outside our own concep-
tual framework. What looks like a settled result might in fact be just 
the beginning of a longer intellectual project and a more arduous 
historical journey, one that should include non-Western, non-
Christian and non-theistic voices. For it seems to be a truism of intel-
lectual history that novel perspectives on old problems open up new, 
sometimes unexpected, directions of thought and that nothing is more 
culturally and intellectually stifling than the insistence that a matter 
has been settled. A critical engagement with the notion of secularism 
thus helps to put the question of religion back on the table in a more 
open way and to highlight the way our engagements with it can be 
limited or even parochial, an issue that will recur more than once in 
the following essays.  
Of course a reconsideration of the philosophical engagement with 
religion, particularly in its practical embodiment, raises questions not 
just about the relationship of politics to religion, but also about what is 
precisely meant by these two concepts. Further, we realise that in 
asking the question of the meaning of the concept ‘religion’ we are led 
to the philosophy of religion. Philosophy of religion is often seen as a 
subdiscipline that is primarily concerned with metaphysical issues 
such as arguments or ‘proofs’ for the existence of God. It is seen as 
predominantly falling within the purview of theoretical philosophy 
(metaphysics, epistemology and logic). This is an impression that 
teaching and publishing in the area does little to correct. It seems to 
imply that the most pressing issues for philosophers are abstract theo-
retical claims about the existence or non-existence of God or the 
problem of evil. These are issues that philosophy has done little to 
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settle, despite the fact that philosophers have, for centuries, attempted 
to resolve them. Set in the context of the first decade of the new cen-
tury the assumption that philosophy of religion ought to be primarily 
concerned with such metaphysical and theoretical issues is deeply 
problematic. Against such an approach it seems that some of the most 
pressing problems connected to contemporary religiosity are about 
the practical consequences of belief and, particularly, the conse-
quences in a religiously pluralistic context. These are the questions 
this book seeks to address and, to some extent, to redress. 
Yet, much contemporary metaphysical argument about religion does 
have a practical element—even if this is seldom recognised. Many of 
these arguments might be considered as part of a culture war between 
the religious and the irreligious. I recall Richard Dawkins’ documen-
tary The enemies of reason,2 where he waxes lyrical about the way this 
or that belief threatens rationality and introduces us to tarot readers 
and faith healers of various descriptions—as if such types are bearing 
down on the academy. It was striking that the documentary was set in 
contemporary Britain, the same Britain that saw Prime Minister Tony 
Blair hold off from conversion to Catholicism until after he left par-
liament for fear of public reaction—not to his embrace of Catholicism, 
but his embrace of religion. Whether or not we want to browbeat 
people for holding beliefs we find irrational, or whether we find many 
of those purveying goods in the esoteric market place to be exploita-
tive, a rational, as opposed to rhetorical, assessment of such 
phenomena does not lead to the conclusion that science or rationality 
                                                             
2 Insofar as the title represents hyperbolic excess its invocation of ‘reason’ is itself 
a humorous irony. One might imagine an army of New Age believers marching 
on Oxford armed with herbal remedies against scientism and ready to point their 
crystals at the nearest evolutionary biologist. One would suggest that Animal 
Rights protesters campaigning against scientific testing on animals have more 
effectively interrupted scientific research.  
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are under threat. They are not. Considering that The God delusion 
(Dawkins 2006) is the product of a British-born Oxford don, and that 
outward expressions of the type of theistic belief that it focuses on are 
marginal in that setting,3 the book becomes something of an enigma. 
It is when attention is focused on religiosity in the US that one can 
begin to descry a more significant motivation for writing such a book. 
Here its political, not its metaphysical, content becomes doubly im-
portant. In that context the book is not simply one that carries the 
banner of atheism (a substantive metaphysical commitment) into 
public discourse, it could also be seen as something of a political in-
tervention within the particular religious, cultural and political milieu 
of the US, the hegemonic world power; and one that might be read as 
vocally confronting religious attempts to “clothe the public square 
with narrow, intolerant moralisms” (Sandel 2005: 246). 
I gladly concede that Dawkins’ challenge is both rational and relevant 
in that context. In a social and political context where the intrication 
of politics and religion is having such broad ramifications and where 
authors like Duane Gish use intellectual charlatanry to promote crea-
tionism’s scientific credentials, perhaps a book like The God delusion 
is just what is needed. Certainly people like Gish do much to create 
false doubts about the kind of evolutionary science to which Dawkins 
                                                             
3 Atheists who are currently preparing a pro-atheism advertising campaign in 
Britain tell us that 72% of British people are religious, but this figure measures the 
nominal affiliation with a church it is not a measure of belief. What these ener-
getic atheists fail to acknowledge is that 65% of British people do not believe in 
any kind of higher being and only 15% of the public attend church on a monthly 
or greater basis. Nor do they give due consideration to the fact that in a British 
context (as in most contexts) religious affiliation has significant non-religious 
implications. For instance whether or not one professes to be culturally Protestant 
or Catholic in Britain may have little to do with belief in God. Further, it is hard to 
get a sense for how these efforts progress the metaphysical neutrality that many 
liberal thinkers see as the essence of the liberal state. 
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has committed his life, thus clouding public discourse. This is some-
thing that all intellectuals ought be concerned about. Using rhetoric to 
cloud an objective engagement with some phenomena for ideological 
reasons is the kind of sophistry that is the bane of the life of the mind. 
If texts like Dawkins’ are primarily confrontations with fundamental-
ist obscurantism and moralism, then may they bloom like flowers in 
the spring. But the question is, in the broader context and setting the 
US aside, is Dawkins’ rather general critique of religion relevant, ra-
tional or necessary? In the context of contemporary Britain, France, 
Germany, Japan, or even Australia, it would seem to be a slightly 
quixotic enterprise—even if it would make sense in other socio-
political contexts. His claims are bald, radical and universal. The prob-
lem here is that speaking in the universal voice always risks running 
up against the problem of particularity. There is a need then to delimit 
carefully what is said, particularly when dealing with religion, which 
not only has manifold particular embodiments but its particular em-
bodiments take on multiple forms depending on the socio-political 
and cultural context in which they are embedded. Blanket generalisa-
tions and a focus on the sensational or the extreme often fail to do 
justice to the complexity of cultural phenomena, such as religion, and 
bring the overall rationality of that enterprise into question.  
Indeed for me, as a philosopher with intellectual investments in the 
discipline of Studies in Religion, books such as those by Dawkins seem 
unnecessarily to distort public discourse in a manner that is not unlike 
that of Gish. One camp clouds the public understanding of science 
with rhetoric to defend religion; the other clouds the public under-
standing of religion with rhetoric in the defence of science. Both Gish 
and Dawkins are combatants in a culture war, a war of position with 
all its political consequences. But here, if we do not proceed in the 
careful, precise and considered manner that is the hallmark of good 
scholarly work, public discourse might end up suffering significant 
collateral damage. 
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It is from this vantage point that we consider some of the questions of 
religion and politics facing philosophers in the contemporary world. 
* * * 
These preliminary remarks broadly situate the research and reading 
we have undertaken in producing this book. The aim has been to 
present the non-specialist reader with a collection of philosophical 
essays that open up a practical (ethical, social and political) engage-
ment with religion from diverse perspectives and intellectual 
orientations so as to stimulate reflection on religion as a practical, 
rather than a metaphysical problem. In particular we have sought to 
stimulate the reader’s thinking about the relation between religion and 
politics and the strengths and limitations of contemporary secular 
discourse. For while metaphysical questions are interesting in their 
own right it is the practical dimension of belief, its capacity to move 
and motivate individual subjects, sometimes towards acts of self-
sacrifice, that impacts upon social life and has consequences that ram-
ify beyond the private realm of the individual believer. Sometimes this 
impact is positive, such as American abolitionists who opposed slav-
ery for religious reasons;4 sometimes that impact is negative. But the 
fact remains that religious belief, tied as it is to substantive concep-
                                                             
4 In an interesting discussion of the abolitionist movement Sandel takes Rawls to 
task for reconstructing their arguments so as to minimise the importance of 
substantive values. For Rawls the abolitionists were justified in bringing religious 
reason to public discourse because their arguments hastened the day when public 
discussion could be conducted in terms of political values rather than substantive 
doctrines. While it may be the case that these arguments contributed to such a 
change it is wrong to suggest: that the abolitionists had secular motivations but 
used religious discourse as a political expedient; or that they actually sought to 
secure the ground for secular discourse; or that they would take pride in the fact 
that their efforts did lead to the promotion of a political life where religious rea-
sons are marginalised (Sandel: 242–43). 
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tions of the good, has the power to move and unite people in the name 
of that good. The power of religious belief to elicit an enduring com-
mitment to some substantive value in a way that is unrivalled by 
contemporary secular politics renders it one of the most interesting, 
important and problematic products of human cultural life. People are 
rarely if ever argued into or out of their beliefs, but these same beliefs 
underlie actions that have broad social significance and as such relig-
ion as a practical, rather than a theoretical or metaphysical, problem 
becomes more pressing. 
There are few collections currently available that address such issues 
from the unique disciplinary perspective of philosophy, as such this 
collection makes an important contribution to philosophical thinking 
about politics, religion and secularity generally. In compiling this 
book we have deliberately sought to cut across divisions and to oper-
ate according to an inclusive criterion, drawing on the one hand on 
the work of both theists and atheists, and on the other hand on both 
Anglophone Analytic and broadly Continental approaches to philoso-
phy. Such inclusion and the deliberate cutting across divisions both 
religious and philosophical brings diversity to the project and plays an 
important role in stimulating the thinking of the reader as opposed to 
attempting to lead them towards a certain view or conclusion.  
While each of the authors reaches their own conclusions about Politics 
and religion the discussions conducted in each of the essays fit within 
the broad project of turning philosophical reflection on religion away 
from explicitly metaphysical or theoretical concerns, towards practical 
considerations of social, ethical and political significance. Each of the 
essays contributes to a project that places religion, as a practical prob-
lem, on the philosophical table. Moreover they are open to the idea 
that our engagements with religion might be limited, one-sided or 
parochial. The conclusion running throughout the papers in this book 
is that we need a way of engaging with religion which, while perhaps 
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not completely free from religious or irreligious commitment, is at 
least reflective about the way such commitments might influence our 
engagement with, and understanding of, religion and with those who 
hold opposing views of whatever stripe. Scholars should be aware of 
the way their own commitments, whether religious or anti-religious, 
may create biases, prejudices and blind spots in their engagement with 
various phenomena and particularly with religion itself.  
The latter notion, the threat of a biased or prejudiced engagement, is 
amply drawn out by the first contribution to the book, from Peter 
Slezak. In a broad ranging critique Slezak, well known as an atheist, 
considers the way the writings of contemporary atheistic thinkers 
such as Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris seem to carry a certain 
prejudice, particularly towards Islam. This leads to a critical response 
to the specifically political implications of such work. As the world 
considers whether Israel engaged in war crimes, in its military offen-
sive against Hamas in Gaza through December 2008 and January 
2009, Slezak shines controversial light on the objectivity of such 
works. If one accepts the case made by Slezak then it would be difficult 
not to conclude that these texts are tainted by a kind of prejudice that 
ought not be accepted in public discourse.  
Following on from the chapter by Slezak, Michael Levine takes the 
problem from the other direction. Again Levine is no theistic philoso-
pher, but his work turns to a consideration of the political character of 
many contemporary philosophical theists, arguing that, while their 
work is outwardly metaphysical in nature, beneath this lie social and 
political impulses. The contemporary philosopher of religion needs to 
be critical of such impulses if they want to move beyond the culture 
war fought between the religious and the irreligious, to say something 
about religion, rather than merely to mount the pulpit of theistic or 
atheistic belief.  
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These thoughts move us naturally into the next three papers each of 
which takes up the relationship between politics and religion specifi-
cally within contemporary social life. Anthony Langlois turns to 
consider the merit of proposals for a move towards a post-secular 
politics, particularly through the work of Jürgen Habermas; Richard 
Paul Hamilton discusses the nature of the Establishment Clause 
within the American constitution and its application in law; and 
Matheson Russell considers the political nature of Christianity and its 
relation to secular discourse, providing an interesting historical per-
spective on this relationship and much food for thought for secular 
thinkers. If the first two contributions lead us to be pessimistic about 
contemporary intellectual culture the following three lead us to a 
sense of optimism about contemporary practice. 
The question of post-secularism, raised by Langlois, leads to the issue 
of pluralism and the special challenges for religion in a globalising 
world. In this regard the essay by Peter Jonkers offers a unique exis-
tential approach to the question of religious truth, one that opens the 
possibility of dialogue between disparate views without necessarily 
giving any of them pre-eminence. To illustrate his discussion Jonkers 
considers the existential place of the Christian notion of forgiveness. 
The fact that philosophical reflection on this question of religious 
truth in a pluralistic context can offer hope rather than the despair of 
mutual incomprehensibility constitutes a reason for optimism about 
the future.  
No engagement with politics and religion in the contemporary world 
could ignore the issue of terrorism and it is one of the most poignant 
aspects of compiling this work that the events of the first years of the 
new century serve both as an important point of departure for the 
project and hang over its very title. The two articles on that theme 
move within the orbit of Giovanna Borradori’s interviews with Jürgen 
Habermas and Jacques Derrida (Borradori 2004). The first of these 
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comes from Michael Strawser, who focuses on forgiveness in Derrida’s 
philosophy and asks about the possibility of forgiveness, as opposed to 
a cycle of vengeance, in the face of terrorism. In this way the paper 
intersects with issues raised by Jonkers. Following Strawser is a con-
tribution by Raymond Aaron Younis who, through a critical 
engagement with the work of both Habermas and Derrida, reaches his 
own conclusions about the role of the philosopher in the face of ter-
rorism, again providing a note of optimism on the powers of human 
reflection. 
These considerations leave open, however, the question of whether 
religion or human impulses connected to what we might call, broadly 
speaking, religiosity, can have a positive role to play within political 
life. Such issues have become important in the context of recent work 
by thinkers as diverse as Michael Sandel (2005) and Simon Critchley 
(2007). In this regard the collection presents two very different ap-
proaches. Firstly in the contribution by Carl Power we have a 
discussion of the work of Bergson, in particular the notion of ‘fabula-
tion’ or the human myth-making capacity. That capacity is important 
to both religious imagination and to imagining political community. 
Here Power shows how Bergson’s discussion is both important and 
relevant to contemporary life, particularly in the political context of 
America in the first decade of the new century.  
Following Power’s contribution is one from Carleton Bruin Christen-
sen on ecopolitics and sustainability. Given the concerns of 
contemporary life, no discussion of politics and religion would be 
complete without addressing this subject. Christensen considers the 
ethics of water use in an Indian context and examines the question of 
how a radical ecopolitics can, contra the deep-ecology movement, 
develop along secular lines.  
The final three chapters of the book are, like Levine’s, orientated on 
issues emerging within philosophy of religion that have a practical or 
16 • Politics and religion in the new century 
political character. In the first of these Paul Crittenden considers the 
relationship between faith and praxis. While it is commonly under-
stood that most believers are neither argued into or out of their 
commitments, according to philosophers like John Cottingham reli-
gious practice is a more important source of motivation than reason. 
Crittenden’s contribution is a critical engagement with Cottingham’s 
argument and, contra Cottingham, he concludes that despite the im-
portance of praxis to religious belief we cannot forgo a rational and 
critical engagement with our beliefs.  
The chapter from Paolo Diego Bubbio also touches on such issues but 
does so through considering the contemporary debate between theis-
tic and atheistic philosophers. This is a debate that has been the 
subject of a slew of texts prominent within intellectual and popular 
culture. Bubbio argues for an engagement with religion that, from 
within philosophy of religion, is neither religiously nor irreligiously 
committed but rather truly philosophical.  
My contribution in the final chapter of the book addresses the nature 
of philosophical engagements with religion and does so through the 
work of Michael Pye. It explores some of the ways in which the ideo-
logical commitments of both the religious and the irreligious alike cast 
shadows over the objective study of religion and ends with some sug-
gestions as to how philosophy of religion could be structured in a way 
that alleviates the concerns raised by Pye. In particular, because relig-
ion has been and still is an important element of human life and 
culture, one whose expressions often exceed the sometimes parochial 
boundaries of philosophy of religion, there is a need for philosophy to 
gain clarity and objectivity on the question: what is religion? 
This reflection returns us to one of the conclusions of the research 
contained in this book. Religion is an important part of human cul-
tural life, one that does not seem likely to disappear, at least not any 
time soon. Rather it is more likely to reconfigure itself, perhaps in 
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unexpected ways, under changing historical circumstances; but it has 
always done that. Religion is part of the fluxing matrix of culture and 
thus bound up in mutually determining ways with social life. But if 
religion is an enduring element of human culture so is politics and as 
such the questions connected to the relation between them are likely 
to remain important. Beliefs and substantive commitments, religious 
or otherwise, will continue to be wellsprings of socially engaged ac-
tion. Beliefs and matters of conscience might seem entirely private but 
the actions based on them are often of public concern.  
It is important then for philosophers not only to reflect on the 
practical significance of religion but also to be open to the idea that, as 
with any aspect of culture, religion is a fluxing phenomenon, changing 
shape with the movement of history. What we take to be essential to 
religion today, might come to be inessential to future generations. As 
we move forward in history, religion and its relation to the life world 
changes, but so does our social and political practice, and intellectually 
we come to a deeper and more complex understanding of ourselves. If 
our understanding of these three nodes of life, religion, politics and 
subjectivity, develops, so will our understanding of their inter-
relation. Our conclusions are thus open to the kind of revision that 
comes from gaining clarity and wisdom about the phenomenon under 
consideration. It is vital that we give to the future an insight into the 
way we see the world, but this insight is, of course, one we draw out of 
our own context and is marked by the concerns and prejudices that 
animate it. Like us, it is finite. Like a family portrait, the content of 
this gift will age and grow alien as time passes. Hopefully not so old or 
alien as to cease being evidence of our own intellectual journey, but 
hopefully it will remain something that we can look upon with 
fondness.  
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